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ABSTRACT: At first glance, happiness and objectivity seem to have little in common.  I claim, 
however, that subjective and eudaimonic happiness promotes arguer objectivity.  To support my 
claim, I focus on connections between happiness, social intelligence, and intellectual virtue.  After 
addressing objections concerning unhappy objective and happy unobjective arguers, I conclude that 
communities should value happiness in argumentative contexts and use happiness as an indicator of 
their capacity for objective argumentation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
At first glance, happiness seems to have little to do with the objectivity of 
argumentation. In epistemology and philosophy of science, objectivity is historically 
associated with detachment, neutrality, impartiality, cold cognition, individualism, 
and seriousness of mind—features of reasoning seemingly at odds with the affective 
dimension of happiness. In psychology, this apparent disconnect between happiness 
and objectivity is supported by research suggesting that happy people are more 
prone to illusions about themselves and the world than unhappy people. (Alloy & 
Abramson, 1979; Mischel, 1979; Yeh & Liu, 2007) And in the areas of critical 
thinking, rhetoric and argumentation, few (if any) connections are made between 
happiness and objectivity. While positive affect and humor have a role in persuasion 
and other functions of argumentation, they are not generally considered relevant to 
arguer and audience objectivity.  
Broader questions concerning the relation of happiness and wisdom have, of 
course, occupied philosophers for thousands of years. The wise person is 
compassionate, virtuous, reflectively self-aware, and of sound judgment, and 
objectivity is relevant to each of these qualities. However, while the debate about 
whether the wise person is also happy continues, my intention in this paper is to 
focus on the narrower issue of happiness and objective argumentation.   
Despite the lack of attention paid to this narrower question, there are good 
reasons to think that subjective and eudaimonic happiness promote the objectivity 
of arguers and audiences. To support this claim, I do what Chaïm Perelman and 
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Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca in The New Rhetoric, say they will not: that is, engage with 
experimental psychology. (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 9) Though of 
interest, they did not think experimental psychology would determine the value of 
argumentation. But research in social and educational psychology can illuminate 
questions of happiness and objectivity in argumentation and so the empirical sound 
of my title ‘Does happiness increase the objectivity of arguers?’ is therefore quite 
intentional. Further integration of argumentation theory and psychology with 
regard to the question of objectivity seems especially important given the intense 
polarization, negativity, and incivility in contemporary argumentation about 
politics, science, economics, and human rights. 
To support my thesis, I first outline a social conception of objectivity based in 
intellectual virtue. Second, I point to psychological research on emotion regulation 
that shows how positive affect might enhance arguer and audience objectivity. 
Finally, I broaden the discussion about happiness and objectivity to examine the 
question of social intelligence and its relation to the creation of more positive 
intellectual communities. I conclude that subjective and eudaimonic well-being is an 
essential element of good social epistemic relations and that good social epistemic 
relations are important for objective argumentation. We should therefore find ways 
to elucidate, value and support subjective and eudaimonic happiness in 
argumentative contexts.   
 
2. SOCIAL, VIRTUOUS OBJECTIVITY  
 
The definition of objectivity I am working with is social and virtue epistemic in 
nature. With Anthony Simon Laden, my starting point is the view “that reasoning is 
always a social activity, it does not work outwards to our relationships with others, 
but begins there.” (Laden, 2012, p. 47) In the context of argumentation, Christopher 
Tindale expresses a similar view.  He says that it 
 
seems a fundamental feature of our social beings that we are “in audience.” What 
this means is that we always have the standpoint of an audience, of what the 
experience of audience feels like; this is our primary relationship to argumentation, 
our entry into it… Thus, audience as a way of being is fundamental to argumentation 
as a social phenomenon. (Tindale, 2011, p. 454) 
 
Any account of objectivity, I argue, should begin with the social. 
It must also be virtue epistemic. Some, like Jason Baehr (2011) identify 
objectivity as an individual epistemic virtue. I think, however, that ‘objectivity’ is 
more of an umbrella term for virtues that ground a commitment to uncovering 
unbiased views of reality (to the extent that this is possible). These virtues also 
communicate this commitment to others in the epistemic and argumentative 
community. Objectivity, then, involves a social commitment to acquiring an 
empirically adequate and unbiased understanding of reality. In the following, I 
consider two benefits arising from this social and virtue epistemic definition of 
objectivity: the first addresses epistemic dependence and trustworthiness; the 
second addresses epistemic diversity. I will also argue that this definition is similar 
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to one contained in the idea of the universal audience, with the notions of 
commitment and responsibility filled out in virtue epistemic terms. 
With regard to epistemic dependence and trustworthiness, a social and 
virtue epistemic understanding of objectivity stands to improve our analysis of 
biases that originate in the belief that reasoning is a highly individualistic and 
independent process. Simple observation reveals a general tendency—amongst 
western-educated academics at least—to trust our own individual thought 
processes over those of others. But as Linda Zagzebski points out, such views are 
usually unwarranted: we do not actually have evidence that we are “more 
[epistemically] trustworthy than other people” (Zagzebski, 2007, pp. 253-54). We 
do, however, have evidence that we are sometimes less epistemically trustworthy 
than others.  
Evidence from psychology supports this view. People who have a highly 
individualistic view of reasoning appear to be less able to evaluate epistemic 
trustworthiness and assimilate multiple sources of information; they also have a 
greater need for cognitive closure. (Bråten et al., 2011; Strømsø et al., 2011; 
Kruglanski, 2009) Also of interest is a study showing that children can delay 
gratification for longer periods of time in trustworthy social environments than in 
untrustworthy social environments. (Kidd et al., 2013) While the children 
participating in this study were delaying gratification for marshmallows rather than 
truth, the ability to delay gratification is important for objective inquiry and 
argumentation. Trustworthy social environments may be essential to the expression 
of epistemic virtues requiring delayed gratification, such as intellectual tenacity, 
intellectual honesty, and intellectual courage. 
The social dimension of epistemic dependence and trustworthiness is 
therefore clearly important to understanding objectivity in argumentation. Naomi 
Scheman observes that  
 
[c]entral to what we do when we call an argument, conclusion, or decision 
“objective” is to recommend it to others, and, importantly, to suggest that they ought 
to accept it, that they would be doxastically irresponsible to reject it without giving 
reasons that made similar claims to universal acceptability. (Scheman, 2001, p. 24) 
  
Objectivity, then, emerges from social and virtuous relationships. Nancy Potter 
(2010) echoes this in her claim that achieving objectivity “is centrally a practice 
involving virtue, the virtue of trustworthiness...” (Potter, 2010, p. 58) 
The second benefit of a social and virtue epistemic understanding of 
objectivity concerns epistemic diversity. Feminist epistemologists have long argued 
that sociality is essential for objectivity and importantly, their accounts stress the 
relevance of diversity of perspective, value, and embodied social location to 
objectivity. (Code, 1987, 1991; Harding, 1986, 1991; Longino, 1990; Solomon, 2001) 
This issue also concerns epistemic trust for as Potter argues, we must  
 
recognize the ways that trust and trustworthiness are compromised by the fact that 
bodies of knowledge do not emerge from generic abstract “human beings” but from 
embodied knowers who have various interests and biases that may impede the 
development of objective knowledge. (Potter, 2010, p. 58) 
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Similar ideas about embodiment and objectivity can be found in Perelman 
and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s New Rhetoric in relation to diverse audiences. They argue 
that the concept of objectivity has to change if it is “to have meaning in a conception 
that does not allow the separation of an assertion from the person who makes it.” 
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 59) The assertions of epistemically 
located, embodied arguers are connected to objectivity (as I define it) through 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s concept of the universal audience. They say: 
 
Instead of believing in a universal audience, analogous to the divine mind which can 
only assent to the “truth,” we might, with greater justification, characterize each 
speaker by the image he himself holds of the universal audience that he is trying to 
win over to his view. Everyone constitutes the universal audience from what he 
knows of his fellow men, in such a way as to transcend the few oppositions he is 
aware of. Each individual, each culture, has thus its own conception of the universal 
audience. The study of these variations would be very instructive, as we would learn 
from it what men, at different times in history, have regarded as real, true, and 
objectively valid. (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 33) 
 
For Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, the universal audience arises from experience 
with particular audiences.(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 461) In 
imagining the universal audience, we need to think about how other audiences 
might view our argument and about how they understand the universal audience. 
The empirical and diverse nature of the universal audience is also apparent in 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s view that while elite audiences often see 
themselves as universal and set “the norm for everybody,” they only embody the 
norm for those who believe them—for others, the elite audience is “no more than a 
particular audience.” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 34)  
The universal audience, then, should be understood as empirically grounded 
in a multiplicity of perspectives and engagement between those perspectives. This is 
a challenging criterion, for as Jane Braeton observes,  
 
to imagine another person’s point of view is far more complex than the analogous 
but simpler ability to imaginatively represent, say, the appearance of an object from 
an angle other than the one from which the viewer is in fact viewing it…In degree of 
complexity, it is more like the ability to understand a debate on a specialized topic, 
which requires education, and the careful observation and distillation of experience. 
But the ability to understand persons requires some additional ability as well. A 
person who is good at responding to other people’s academic arguments may not be 
good at understanding people. (Braeton, 1990, p. 6) 
 
I would add that if they do not understand people very well, the quality of their 
responses—and their objectivity—will also suffer. Arguably, then, those who think 
of the universal audience in abstract, uniform, disembodied terms will have reduced 
access to the objectivity-enhancing activity of imagining diversity during argument 
construction.  
A social and virtue epistemic understanding of objectivity makes better sense 
of our experience of epistemic trust, epistemic dependence, epistemic diversity, and 
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the value of constructing universal audiences alongside arguments. I now turn to 
consider what psychological studies about emotion regulation might indicate about 
the role of positive moods and emotions in objective argumentation. 
 
3.  EMOTION REGULATION, POSITIVE AFFECT, AND OBJECTIVITY 
  
Many philosophers argue for greater integration of emotion into epistemological 
issues. (De Sousa, 1987, 2008; Jaggar, 1989; Nussbaum, 2001; Scheffler, 1991; 
Thagard, 2006; Zagzebski, 1996) Some argue that we can use emotions cognitively 
to counter bias, and thus challenge the idea that emotions undermine objectivity. 
(Frye, 1983; Lugones, 2003; Ortega, 2006) Others have developed accounts of 
emotion and its management in the context of critical thinking, rhetoric, and 
argumentation. (Auchlin, 1990; Bailin, 2006; Gilbert, 1997; Walton, 1992) To build 
on this work, it is useful to consider research on emotion regulation in the field of 
psychology, especially with regard to the issue of objective argumentation. I am 
particularly interested in emotion regulation studies that situate participants in a 
social context. (Campos et al., 2011; Kappas, 2011) It is my view that these studies 
support the happiness-objectivity connection principally by casting doubt on the 
depressive realism hypothesis.  And these doubts may be especially relevant to 
argumentation.  
The depressive realism hypothesis (Mischel, 1979) is the claim that people 
suffering from depression have more realistic perceptions of reality than the non-
depressed. The depressed, it seems, evaluate themselves and other people more 
realistically. (See Birinci & Dirik, 2008) But this hypothesis is problematic for a 
number of reasons. Studies providing evidence for the depressive realism 
hypothesis have been criticized for not incorporating the kinds of emotional and 
social situations people encounter in everyday life into their experimental design. 
(Birinci & Dirik, 2008, p. 3) When you do incorporate these everyday life situations, 
evidence suggests that the depressed have less accurate evaluations of reality. 
(Pacini et. al., 1998)  
One reason for this finding may concern the role of emotion regulation and 
intellectual virtue in helping us pay attention to the right things. Paying attention to 
the right things is one of the cornerstones of objective reasoning. Objectivity 
requires us to pay attention to relevant features of reality and ignore irrelevant 
features. Emotions can help with this: emotions affect what we pay attention to, and 
what we pay attention to affects our emotions (Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2011). 
Intellectual virtues can also help us pay attention to the right things. 
Fairmindedness motivates us to attend respectfully to contrasting viewpoints. 
Tenacity sustains attention under conditions of adversity. You can also use virtue to 
regulate emotion and vice versa. This means that if your ability to regulate emotion 
is decreased, this will adversely affect your ability to exercise virtue and 
consequently direct your attention to the right things. Because depressed people 
tend to ruminate about negative life events (Nolem-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993), we 
might expect to find that they have narrowed their attention. This narrowing of 
attention might explain why the depressed evaluate reality more accurately in 
artificial experimental environments with reduced variables of interaction, but less 
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accurately when navigating the complexity of everyday life. Attention difficulties 
could easily lead to bias in argumentation given its inherent social complexity. 
Social context studies of emotion regulation also challenge the depressive 
realism hypothesis because of their finding that emotion regulation involves the 
interpersonal negotiation of goals. According to Campos et al. (2011), emotion 
management in a social context  
 
involves a regulatory triad of relinquishing, modifying, or persevering with one’s 
goals in an attempt to move from conflict to negotiated outcome…On the former 
[nonsocial] account, emotion regulation centers on meeting one’s goal. In the 
relational view, emotion regulation is just as often about negotiating outcomes, 
including relinquishing one’s goals in the interests of the negotiated outcome. 
(Campos et. al., 2011, p. 28) 
 
The kind of negotiation involved here is very similar to—and overlaps with—the 
kind of negotiation that takes place between arguers and audiences. As Tindale 
(2004, 2006) claims, audiences have an active and influential role in argumentation. 
They can influence the direction of an argument, what an arguer can achieve, what 
an arguer wants to achieve, as well as change their own objectives and views. 
How successful arguer-audience negotiations are in relation to maintaining a 
commitment to acquiring knowledge will depend on how well arguers and 
audiences regulate emotion and manage cognitive goals. A study by Anderson et al. 
(2013) found that incivility in online comments about a neutral blog post on 
nanotechnology had the effect of polarizing perceptions of risk amongst the 
participants. This finding is not startling: most are familiar with situations wherein 
incivility has a negative effect on arguer and audience objectivity. But it underscores 
the effort required to negotiate emotions and cognitive goals and maintain 
emotional environments conducive to objectivity. Psychologists Heather Wadlinger 
and Derek Isaacowitz point out that to 
 
reappraise a negative situation, attention must disengage from the negative 
information or interpretation and reorient toward finding or creating evidence for 
an alternative interpretation. (Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2011, p. 77) 
 
But shifting attention away from incivility or other negative relations may require 
greater effort for depressed individuals—or even those who are simply unhappy—
than it does for others. For this reason, emotion regulation may be even more 
important for objectivity in argumentative contexts—contexts wherein negative 
emotions can very easily arise. If the unhappy are hampered in their ability to 
regulate emotions, we might expect them to have difficulty negotiating goals in 
social contexts; and hence, their ability to argue objectively may be weakened. 
Social context research might also explain why positive affect seems to 
enhance reasoning. Some evidence in psychology supports a modest positive 
correlation between wisdom and happiness (Bergsma & Ardelt, 2012). A positive 
correlation also exists between mindfulness—an ability strongly associated with 
wisdom—and recovery from depression. (Williams & Kabat-Zinn, 2011) Kareem 
Johnson’s (2010) research shows that smiling—even fake smiling—reduces 
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prejudicial perceptions of others and reduces the attention we pay to racial 
categories. Smiling and the positive feelings it creates regulates emotion and this 
seems to influence the objectivity of our perceptions of others.  
Arguers and audiences able to create trusting and virtuous social contexts 
using emotion regulation may well have an easier time negotiating emotional and 
argumentative goals. As Michael Gilbert (1997) argues, we can better achieve our 
goals when we treat argumentation as arising from agreement rather than 
disagreement. Arguers and audiences may have an easier time supporting a 
commitment to acquiring knowledge of reality in such contexts. And as I argue next, 
trusting and virtuous argumentative contexts are also more likely to involve 
happiness. 
 
4. SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE, HAPPINESS, AND OBJECTIVITY 
 
Braeton (1990) claims that many intellectual virtues involve a type of social ability 
and that there exists an important relationship between this virtue epistemic social 
ability and community building. She says that the  
 
building of community, which involves real, particular others in unique and complex 
circumstances, is intellectual work which requires a special intellectual competence. 
(Braeton, 1990, p. 5) 
 
She connects community building to eudaimonic happiness, pointing out that “the 
building of community is the creation of an environment in which all members of 
the community have the opportunity to live well.” (Braeton, 1990, p. 5) Living well 
in a community requires that that community promote objectivity using diversity. 
Imagining a non-sexist society is, she claims, a much greater intellectual 
achievement than imagining our current society with slight changes to certain 
norms. There is, she says, a “close connection between the social ability to see a 
problem from another person’s subjective perspective and the logical ability to 
analyze the problem.”(Braeton, 1990, p. 10) For Braeton, then, eudaimonistic 
communities are more likely to be objective. 
 Nancy Snow (2010) also argues that virtues are a type of social intelligence 
and links them empirically with eudaimonistic communities. Virtues, in her account, 
involve “cognitive-motivational-affective wholes” and there is, she says, “a deep and 
enduring sense of happiness that is psychologically impossible” without them 
(Snow, 2008, p. 93 & p. 225) Virtue is necessary to the factors most strongly 
associated with happiness, such as “close personal relationships and meaningful 
community ties, and developing skills of autonomy, competency, and relatedness.” 
(Snow, 2008, p. 227) It is hard, Snow points out,  
 
to imagine how one might forge meaningful community ties without the aid of some 
degree of virtue, especially virtues such as conscientiousness, honesty, loyalty, 
trustworthiness, cooperation, benevolence, generosity, kindness, compassion, 
considerateness, justice, tolerance, friendliness, and temperance. (Snow, 2008, p. 
234) 
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Snow focuses largely on ethical virtues, but it is also important to make 
explicit the role of intellectual virtues and virtues of will power in community 
building, particularly in relation to argumentative communities. Problems with 
epistemic trust that arise during argumentation could originate in a lack of social 
intelligence so defined. Snow says that “the lack of adequate knowledge of whom to 
trust and of how to detect signs of an untrustworthy character is a lack of social 
intelligence.” (Snow, 2010, p. 96) Argumentative communities lacking social 
intelligence so defined will be less happy—and less able to sustain the kind of 
commitment to reality objectivity requires. 
  The foregoing suggests that to foster objectivity in communities of 
argumentation, we need to strengthen skills of virtue, emotion regulation, and social 
intelligence in Snow and Braeton’s senses of the term. Argumentative communities 
that support subjective and eudaimonic happiness will have an easier time 
strengthening these factors. In such contexts, arguers and audiences are likely to 
find it easier to change their minds in the face of evidence and imagine diverse, 
multifaceted audiences. They are more likely to be resilient and assertive in the face 
of negative commentary and find it easier to disagree respectfully. Overall, we can 
expect such communities to support a deeper commitment to acquiring an 
empirically adequate understanding of reality.  
Olbrechts-Tyteca’s (1974) unusual question about whether the universal 
audience laughs was therefore quite prescient. Laughter focuses our attention on 
the audience and helps us come to know them. For David Frank and Michelle 
Bolduc, Olbrechts-Tyteca  
 
offers a vision of argumentation that hinges on a deep sense of humanity … She 
suggests that laughter itself comprises a wish for universalization and human 
communion that is also inherent to the concept of the universal audience. (Frank 
and Bolduc, 2011, p. 73) 
 
This longing for positive social connections in the context of argumentation and 
reasoning is poorly recognized. Laden says: 
 
The isolation that failure to reason together creates is not a matter of a failure of 
coordination. It is the sense that no one understands what you say or do, or who you 
are. Such isolation can be the result or the cause of madness, even a kind of death. 
(Laden, 2012, p. 22) 
 
Thus, not only can the pursuit of happiness amongst arguers and audiences better 
support objectivity—it also stands to address the isolation and suffering that so 
commonly undermines argumentation. 
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